

DECISION AND STATEMENT OF REASONS OF JOSEPHINE BONNAR, LEGAL MEMBER OF THE FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL WITH DELEGATED POWERS OF THE CHAMBER PRESIDENT

Under Rule 8 of the First-tier Tribunal for Scotland Housing and Property Chamber Rules of Procedure 2017 ("the Procedural Rules")

in connection with

1 Alloa Road, Carron, FK2 8EJ ("the Property")

Case Reference: FTS/HPC/EV/20/0807

Arlene Harrison, David Harrison c/o RGM Solicitors, 9 La Port Precinct, Grangemouth, FK3 8AZ ("the Applicants")

Emma Bryce, Ewan Dick, 1 Alloa Road, Carron, FK2 8EJ ("the Respondents")

- 1. By application received on 6 March 2020 the Applicants seek an eviction order in terms of Rule 109 of the Procedural Rules and section 51(1) of the Private Housing Tenancies (Scotland) Act 2016 ("the 2016 Act"). The Applicants lodged documents in support of the application including a copy tenancy agreement, rent statement and Notice to leave dated 17 December 2019 with a Sheriff Officer certificate of service. Both the application form and the Notice to leave state that an eviction order is sought on the basis of ground 12, rent arrears over three consecutive months. The documents also indicate that the rent arrears started on 1 November 2019.
- 2. On 23 April 2020 the Tribunal issued a request for further information to the Applicants. The Applicants were asked to provide a copy of the Section 11 Notice issued to the Local Authority and to confirm if the application should be amended to include the name of the Second Applicant, as joint owner of the property. The Applicants were also asked to clarify the position regarding the

period of the arrears of rent established at the date of service of the Notice to leave. On 6 May 2020 the Applicant's solicitor responded to the request. A copy of the Section 11 Notice was provided and the solicitor confirmed the application should be amended to include the second Applicant. With regard to the question about the Notice to Leave the solicitor indicated that the Respondents had been in arrears of rent for three or more consecutive months at the date of lodging the application but did not comment on the position as at the date of service of the Notice to Leave.

DECISION

- 3. The Legal Member considered the application in terms of Rule 8 of the Chamber Procedural Rules. That Rule provides:-
 - "Rejection of application
 - **8.**—(1) The Chamber President or another member of the First-tier Tribunal under the delegated powers of the Chamber President, must reject an application if—
 - (a) they consider that the application is frivolous or vexatious;
 - (b) the dispute to which the application relates has been resolved;
 - (c) they have good reason to believe that it would not be appropriate to accept the application;
 - (d) they consider that the application is being made for a purpose other than a purpose specified in the application; or
 - (e) the applicant has previously made an identical or substantially similar application and in the opinion of the Chamber President or another member of the First-tier Tribunal, under the delegated powers of the Chamber President, there has been no significant change in any material considerations since the identical or substantially similar application was determined.
 - (2) Where the Chamber President, or another member of the First-tier Tribunal, under the delegated powers of the Chamber President, makes a decision under paragraph (1) to reject an application the First-tier Tribunal must

4. After consideration of the application and the documents submitted by the Applicant in support of same, the Legal Member considers that the application should be rejected on the basis that it is frivolous within the meaning of Rule 8(1)(a) of the Rules.

Reasons for Decision

- 5. 'Frivolous' in the context of legal proceedings is defined by Lord Justice Bingham in *R v North West Suffolk (Mildenhall) Magistrates Court,* (1998) Env LR9. He indicated at page 16 of the judgment; "What the expression means in this context is, in my view, that the court considers the application to be futile, misconceived, hopeless or academic". It is that definition which the Legal Member has considered as the test in this application, and on consideration of this test, the Legal Member considers that this application is frivolous, misconceived and has no prospect of success.
- 6. The Legal Member notes that Notice to leave is dated 17 December 2019. A Sheriff Officer certificate of service has been produced indicating that it was served on the same date. The Notice to leave states that the arrears of rent upon which the Notice is based started on 1 November 2019. The rent statement lodged with the application supports this statement.
- 7. Ground 12 of Schedule 3 of the 2016 Act states "(1) it is an eviction ground that the tenant has been in rent arrears for three or more consecutive months." Section 52 (3) of the 2016 Act states "An application for an eviction order against a tenant must be accompanied by a copy of a notice to leave which has been given to the tenant". Section 62 of the 2016 Act states, "(1) References in this part to a notice to leave are to a notice which (a) is in writing, (b) specifies the day on which the landlord under the tenancy in question expects to become entitled to make an application for an eviction order to the First-tier tribunal, (c) states the eviction ground or grounds, on the basis of which the landlord proposes to seek an eviction order in the event that the tenant does not vacate the let property before the end of the day specified in accordance with paragraph (b) and, (d) fulfils any other requirements prescribed by the Scottish Ministers in regulations.
- 8. In the case of Abdul Majid against Adele Gaffney and Andrew Robert Britton 2019 UT 59, the Upper Tribunal refused permission to appeal. The Applicants

had submitted an application to the Tribunal for an eviction order on the basis of ground 12. The application was rejected by the Tribunal on the ground that the Respondent had not been in rent arrears for three or more consecutive months at the date of service of the Notice. In refusing the application for permission to appeal the Upper Tribunal stated, "(14) The statutory provision is clear which is that the ground of eviction must be satisfied at the date of service of the Notice to Leave. If it is not, it is invalid. If it is invalid decree for eviction should not be granted. The decision of the First-tier tribunal sets out the position with clarity. It could in my view it could never have been intended by Parliament that a landlord could serve a notice specifying a ground not yet available in the expectation that it may become available prior to the making of an application. Such an approach would be open to significant abuse. Either the ground exists at the time when the Notice to leave is served, or it does not. If it does not, the notice to leave is invalid and it cannot be founded on as a basis for overcoming security of tenure that the 2016 Act."

9. The Legal Member notes that the only eviction ground stated in the application and the Notice to leave is ground 12 – rent arrears for three or more consecutive months. The application and the evidence lodged in support of the application indicate that the Respondents had been in arrears of rent for just over 6 weeks when the Notice to Leave was served on them. Having regard to the 2016 Act and the decision of the Upper Tribunal in Majid v Gaffney, the Legal Member concludes that the Notice to Leave is invalid and determines that the application is therefore frivolous, misconceived and has no prospect of success. The application is rejected on that basis.

What you should do now

If you accept the Legal Member's decision, there is no need to reply.

If you disagree with this decision -

An applicant aggrieved by the decision of the Chamber President, or any Legal Member acting under delegated powers, may appeal to the Upper Tribunal for Scotland on a point of law only. Before an appeal can be made to the Upper Tribunal, the party must first seek permission to appeal from the First-tier Tribunal. That party must seek permission to appeal within 30 days of the date the decision was sent to them. Information about the appeal procedure can be forwarded to you on request.

Josephine Bonnar Legal Member 26 May 2020